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PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEDURES IN KENTUCKY
Harry J. Rothgerber, Jr.
and J. W. Deese*
I. METHODS OF COMMENCEMENT OF PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
A.

I.

Proceedings may be commenced without arrest.
1.

The discretionary power conferred to the Parole Board in
KRS 439.430 implicitly recognizes this method of commencement.

2.

KRS 439.360 also allows the Parole Board to subject the parolees
to its orders without arrest.

B.

If the Parole Board believes that a condition of parole has been
violated, KRS 439.430(4) authorizes the issuance by the board of a
warrant for the parolee's arrest.

C.

The most common method of initiating proceedings is through a
warrantless arrest by a parole officer or police upon a written
statement by the parole officer that he has reason to believe that
a condition has been violated. KRS 439.430(l)
1.

This written statement is sufficient to cause the detention of
a parolee without a warrant. KRS 439.430(0)

2.

KRS 439.430(0) demands immediate notification of the parole
officer's director, as well as the submission of a written
report containing the alleged violations. The director, in turn,
reports to the board which will determine whether to issue a
warrant or command the parolee's release.

DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF PAROLE REVOCATION
A.

Parole revocation is a two-step process involving both a praliminary
and final revocation hearing and the Supreme Court has determined
that procedural safeguards are needed at both stages. Morrissey v.
Brewer, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972); Preston v. Piggman, 496 F.2d 270 (6th
Ci r. 1974) .
1.

Since a parolee will suffer a "grievious loss" of liberty by
revocation, he is generally entitled to a prompt preliminary
hearing to determine if probable cause exists to detain him for
the alleged parole violation. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra at 2602.
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2.

a.

If his present I:berty is denied solely due to the flleged
violatlin, a prompt preliminary hearing is necessary,
Id.;
Wells v. Webb, Xy., 511 S.W.2d 214 (1974).

b.

If the parolee is serving time on other charges, the pendancy
of revocation proceedings or the prospect of 'Future proceedings is not considered a restraint on his present liberty.
Therefore, a prompt disposition of the warrant is unnecessary.
Moody v. Daggett, 97 S.Ct. 24 (1976).

c.

If the parolee has left the jurisdiction, a preliminary
hearing may be held in his absence. Davis v. Black, Ky.,
518 S.W.2d 338 (1975).

d.

To satisfy due process, the preliminary hearing should normally
be held at the locality in which the parolee is initi9ly
confined. See Morrissey v. Brewer, sunra at 2602.

Due process must be afforded at the preliminary hearing to determine
whether there is "probable cause" to hold the parolee for a parole
violation.
a.

A notice of the hearing stating the alleged violaticns and
the lImited purpose of the hearing is necessary, Morrissay
v. Brewt., supra at 2603. Id.

b.

Tha parolee may appear, speak in his own behalf and introduce
documents with relevant information. Id.

c.

The parolee may have witnesses with relevant information and
can request that the adverse witnesses on which the alleged
violations are based be present for confrontation and crossexamination.
Id.
i.

If th Administrative Law Judge specifically finds that
there is just reason to deny the right to confrontation,
the parolee can be precluded from confrontation and crossexamination. Id.; See also Rogers v. 1Hurley, 486 S.W.2d
696, 697 (1972T7

ii. Although KRS 439.390 gives the hoard subpoena powzr to
secure the attendance of witnesses in parole proceedings,
it has been held hy the Court of Appeals in an unpublished
opinion that a parolee cannot compel 'he board to use
this power at the preliminary hearing. This opinion does
not seem to comport with the directives of Morrissey v.
Brewer, supra.
d.

The parolee is entitled to an independent decision maker.
Morrissey v. Brwer, supra at 2602.

e.

3.

The parolee is entitled to a written reporc of the prel iminary hearing. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra at 2603.

The Supreme Court has held that a final parole revocation hearing must be held within a reasonable time after the parolee is
taken into custody. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra at 2604.
a.

Even though the Supreme Court did not say how much time was
reasonable, it did say that a two month delay was not
unreasonable. Id.

b.

Under KRS 439.440, a final revocation hearing must be held
within thirty days after the parolee is returned to prison.
i.

Since KRS 439,440 applies only when the prisoner is
returned to prison for a violation of his parole, the
Board has determined that a return due to a new conviction negates the need to comply with the thirty-day
limit. Accordingly, the Parole Board determines the
propriety of his reincarceration when he first sees the
board on his new sentence.

ii. The Supreme Court recently held that a parolee, imprisoned
for a crime committed while on parole, is not constitutionally
entitled to an immediate parole revocation hearing even
though a parole violation warrant is issued and filed as
a detainer. Moody v. Daggett, supra.
iii.

4.

A statute calling for automatic revocation based on a
new conviction is unconstitutional, however, if it cannot
be construed to allow a meaningful opportunity to be
heard in mitigation. Moss v. Patterson, 555 F.2d 137
(5th Cir. 1977).

Since the Parole Board is determining whether the parolee's liberty
should be forfeited at a parole revocation hearing, the parolee is
entitled to more formal procedural safeguards than at the preliminary
hearing.
a.

The parolee is entitled to a written notice of the parole
violations alleged. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra at 2604;
Forbes v. Roebuck, 36 F.Supp. 817 (E.D. Ky. 1974) affirmed
506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1974).

b.

Evidence that will be used in support of parole revocation
must be disclosed. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra at 2604. A
presumption in favor of disclosure limits the privilege under
KRS 439.510 which shields disclosure of information obtained
by a parole officer.

c.

The parolee must be afforded an opportunity to appear before
the board to state reasons why his parole should not be revoked.
Id.

d.

Presentation of witnesses and documentary evidence must
be allowed. Id.; Preston v. Piggman, supra. The board
has subpoena power to assure this right. KRS 439.390.

e.

Confrontation and cross-examination must be allowed unless
the board can find good cause not to. Morrissey v. Brewer,

supra at 2604; Rogers v. Hurley, supra at

697.

f. A "neutral and detached" hearing body must conduct the
hearing. The parole board itself is considered to meet
this requirement. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra at 2604.
g.

If parole is revoked, a written statement with specific findings of evidence and the board's reasons must be given. Id.;
Forbes v. Roebuck, supra at 820; Rogers v. Hurley, supra at

697.

5. Any decision by the Parole Board revoking parole is subject to a due
process review by the Courts. See Davis v. Black, supra; Preston
v. Piggman, supra.
III. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS OF PAROLE REVOCATION
A.

As a general rule, evidence relied on to justify revocation of parole
does not have to comply with the rules of evidence required in a
criminal trial. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra at 2604.
I. The board may consider "letters, affidavits and other material"
not usually admissable at trial. Id.
2. Hearsay or double hearsay alone may be iiisufficient to cause
revocation due to its inherent denial of confrontation. State
v. Mingua. 327 N.E.2d 791 (ohio App. 1974).
3. Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment can be used
in parole hearings. United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975).
4. Parole may not be revoked solely on the basis of a new charge of
a criminal offense. Ewing v. Waldrop, 397 F.Supp. 509 (N.D.N.C.
1975).
5. Parole may not be revoked on a new charge if the parolee is
acquitted. Standlee v. Rhay, 403 F.Supp. 1247 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
6. Evidence from an offense of which the parolee is acquitted may
be used against him in revocation hearings. See United States
v. lannece, 405 F.Supp. 599 (E.D. Pa. 1975).

B. Since parole revocation proceedings are not the equivalent of a
criminal prosecution, a burden of proof of "beyond a reasonable doubt"
is not necessary.

1.

At the preliminary hearing, the limited determination of
probable cause to hold the parolee pending a final revocation
hearing justifies the introduction of only "some evidence"
to support revocation. Kidd v. Robinson, F.Supp. (W.D. Wash.

1976).
2.

The standard of proof used at the final revocation hearing
differs according to the jurisdiction. All cases since
Morrissey, supra, have declined to demand a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard. See United States v. Strada, 503 F.2d 1087
(8th Cir. 1974) ("reasonably satisfied"); United States v.
Sample, 378 F.Supp. 43 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("preponderance of evidence").

IV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
A.

There is no absolute right to counsel at either the preliminary or
final revocation hearings.
Since such proceedings are not a part of
the criminal prosecution, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right
to counsel does not apply and due process of law only requires the
application of this right on a selective basis in complex or close
cases. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S.Ct 1756 (1973); Forbes v. Roebuck,
supra at 819; Reeder v. Commonwealth, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 491 (1973).
1.

To guarantee that the rights afforded by Morrissey v. Brewer,
su2ra, are effective, the state may be required to furnish
counsel at its expense in certain cases.
a.

Presumptively, counsel should be provided in cases where the
parolee makes a request for counsel based on a timely and
colorable claim that he has not committed the alleged
violation or there are substantial reasons which are complex or difficult to develop that would justify or mitigate
the violation making revocation inappropriate. Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, supra at 1764.

b.

The parolee's ability to speak effectively in his behalf
should be considered, especially in doubtful cases. Id.

c.

If counsel is refused, the reasons must be set out in the
record. Id.

2.

While KRS 533.050 provides that a defendant is entitled to
assistance of counsel at probation revocation proceedings, no
parallel statute pertaining to parole exists.

3.

KRS 31.llO(2)(a), a provision of the Public Defender Act of 1972,
states that a needy person is entitled to have counsel at all
stages when a person providing his own counsel would be entitled
to be represented by an attorney, including revocation of probation or parole. The pertinent question here is whether a nonindigent defendant would be entitled to counsel.

